Chapter Eight
The Kentucky
Campaign: Perryville
After the battle, the people in the area
opened their homes to the wounded on both sides. A farmer allowed Cleburne to recuperate in
his home for what would be a very slow recovery. He could not talk or eat for
some time but was able to write his report two days after the battle.
General Smith awarded Cleburne’s troops a well-earned day’s rest
and supplied them with rations and new uniforms from the captured Federal
stores. Robert D. Smith recorded on August 31:
We have all been
busy today bringing in the captured stores. I have changed 8oo Guns in my
division (Perc. Muskets) for new Minnie Rifles, I also have 120 rounds of
ammunition to the man. Maj. Brown, Chief of Ord. of this army, says that we
have captured 5,000 stands of arms. (1)
On September 2, Kirby Smith’s army marched
into Lexington
where they were received with an enthusiastic welcome. New recruits, the
arrival of Heth’s division and a brigade from Stevenson’s division increased their
number to 11,000 infantry. Since the merge of Cleburne
and Preston Smith’s brigades had only been temporary, the division was
effectively broken up and Cleburne went back to commanding
his brigade, consisting of the 13th/15th Arkansas, 2nd and 5th Tennessee, and the 5th
Confederate Infantry Regiments. The 5th Confederate was composed
almost entirely of Irishmen.
A day before the Battle of Richmond, Bragg
had begun his journey north from Chattanooga.
Marching through Middle Tennessee, Bragg had avoided Buell’s Army stationed at Nashville and marched his forces to wards Glasgow, Kentucky.
“Bragg's Confederates and Buell's Unionists now
began a race northward. They marched on roughly parallel courses, the Rebels
aiming for Glasgow, the Yankees for Bowling
Green. Bragg had the advantage over his opponent in
this race--Buell had to be wary that this wasn't a trick to lure him out of
Nashville while the Rebel army doubled back to take the city. Consequently,
Bragg reached his objective on September 12, two days ahead of Buell.” (2)
Bragg’s plan was to march to Bardstown and
then on to Louisville.
There, he would join with Smith’s Army approximately on the 23. To coordinate
with this plan, Bragg called for Cleburne
and Preston Smith’s Brigades to rejoin his army and occupy Shelbyville. Shortly
after this, Cleburne’s
wound had healed enough to allow him to travel. He had grown a beard during his
convalescence; both to cover up the scar and because it was too painful to
shave. Robert D. Smith recorded on September 23, that the general “returned to
camp today, he is almost well again, he says he will take command again
tomorrow. His appearance is somewhat altered as he is minus six teeth.” (3)
Before Bragg’s plan could be carried out,
he learned that a Confederate infantry brigade that had been scavenging for
food had attacked and been defeated by a Federal garrison at Munfordville, Kentucky.
Bragg wrote that he was “Unwilling to allow the impression of a disaster to
rest on the minds of my men” and marched almost the entire army in a seemingly
out-of-the-way direction to Munfordville. (4)
“Had Bragg struck
immediately, he might well have put Buell in a very awkward position and forced
him to fight on ground favorable to the Confederates. Instead, he allowed
himself to be talked into an extremely foolish compromise by one of his
subordinates, Maj. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner. It seemed that Munfordville was
Buckner's home town--he was loath to see it bombarded. Buckner suggested that
he be allowed to parley with the garrison and convince them of the hopelessness
of their position. Bragg grudgingly acquiesced.” (5)
Bragg wrote: “Hardee's wing moved by Cave City
direct upon Munfordville, and Polk, by the Bear Wallow road, crossed the river
some miles to the right and gained the enemy's rear in the afternoon of the
16th. An immediate demand for the surrender of the garrison was made, and after
a few hours' negotiation an unconditional submission was obtained. We secured
4,267 prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery, 5,000 small-arms, and a proportional
quantity of ammunition, horses, mules, and military stores.” (6)
Bragg was now in a perfect position. His
determination had placed his army in between Buell’s Army at Bowling
Green and Louisville.
Smith was only 100 miles away and ready to give Bragg reinforcements to defeat
Buell. Sam Watkins, a private in Bragg’s army recalled the rise in morale after
the capture:
The bands played
merrier and livelier tunes. It was the patient convalescing; the fever had left
him, he was getting fat and strong; the old fire was seen to illuminate his
eyes; his step was buoyant and proud, he felt ashamed that he had ever been
“hacked”; he could fight now. It was the same old proud soldier of yore. The
bands played “Dixie” and the “bonnie Blue
Flag,” the citizens cheered, and the ladies waved their handkerchiefs and threw
us bouquets.
Regrettably, Bragg soon lost this
determination. He ordered his army to leave this position and join with Smith’s
army. Bragg defended his decision by stating that his forces were exhausted and
sick. He wrote: “I could not prudently afford to attack him there in his
selected position. Should I pursue him farther toward Bowling Green he might fall back to that
place and behind his fortifications. Reduced at the end of four days to three
days' rations, and a hostile country, utterly destitute of supplies, a serious
engagement brought on anywhere in that direction could not fail (whatever its
results) to materially cripple me.” (7)
The march was set for September 19.
However, in a strange twist of events, Bragg feared that Buell would attack him
before that time. He countermanded the order and set the march for the 18.
During the night of the 18, Bragg suddenly became highly agitated from fear of
either a flank attack or a direct attack upon his lines. The army left on the
20, traveling northeast, arriving in Bardstown on the 22.
In continuation to Bragg’s puzzling
behavior, he left his army at Bardstown on a “tour of inspection” through Springfield, Perryville, Danville
and finally to Lexington
on October 1. Here, he arranged for the installation of Richard Hawes as
Confederate governor of Kentucky.
(8)
While Bragg was on his “tour”, Buell’s army bypassed the Confederates at Bardstown and occupied Louisville on the 25.
Upon learning of this intelligence, Bragg set up a screen around Frankford to
protect the ceremony. Cleburne’s
Brigade would act as part of this screen in Shelbyville. Other towns which
served as outposts were Shepardsville, Mount Washington,
and Taylorville.
Cleburne’s Brigade, as well
as the other units on this screen were in a precarious position. An army of
61,000 men was just north of him with easy access to railroads. Cleburne reported that
“They are running cars a short distance on this road. Our pickets heard their
cars during all of night before last.”
Bragg’s
orders were not reassuring in the least: “if pressed by the enemy, fall back to
Frankford.” (9)
On October 1, Cleburne reported that Scott’s Cavalry had
skirmished with an advancing enemy but were forced to fall back. He reported
that “they are within 5 or 6 miles of here now
[Rosecrans] is said to command one of the divisions. I will be forced to
leave and will carry out the instructions recd from Genl Bragg.” (10)
General Leonidas Polk, commanding
Bragg’s Army at Bardstown reported that he was being attacked and would fall
back to Harrodsburg. Bragg decided that the offensive against Polk was simply a
diversion; the main assault must be against Frankford, where the gubernatorial
ceremonies were to be held. Therefore, Bragg ordered Polk to attack the enemy
in his front. When Polk received these orders, he was confused. Polk was
certain that Bragg, who was 100 miles away from the front, had it backwards.
The enemy attacking him now had come in strong force from Louisville, where Buell was. Polk held a
council with his commanders and decided to disobey Bragg and fall back to a
stronger position in Harrodsburg.
Cleburne,
too, decided to fall back from his position in Shelbyville to Frankfort. Robert D. Smith recorded for
October 1, the day before this move:
Our advance guards
have been skirmishing all day with the enemy—they are reported advancing on us
in three columns, one in our rear—I should not be surprised if we moved from
here tonight—I shall be really sorry if we do, for the citizens here that have
been so kind and attentive to all our wants will suffer when we leave.
That
night, around 1am, the brigade marched 23 miles, arriving in the capitol at
10am. Smith recorded, “the enemy entered Shelbyville this morning. I understand
they have been busy today arresting the citizens that showed us any favors, a
large number of citizens came with us”. A Yankee newspaper in Shelbyville
recorded that “the rebel force” commanded by “General Claiborne” fell back with
“such haste” from the town but that they promised the citizens that they would
“make a stand against the Federal force” in Frankfort. The newspaper wrongly
estimated Cleburne’s
Brigade at 4,000 men, saying that they would be no match for the army under
General Sill. (11)
The brigade’s stay at the capitol was
brief. Cleburne
received orders to move his brigade to Harrodsburg where he would once again be
under General Hardee’s Division. The left on October 4 at 4am, rain falling
during much of the march. The Confederates were in a bad way. Bragg’s Army of
two wings were in the vicinity of Harrodsburg and Perryville and Smith’s Army
was 25 miles to the north near Versailles.
Both army’s combined totals were less than 45,000.
The next day, October 3, Bragg
ordered Smith to advance to Frankfort
to preside over the gubernatorial ceremony. However, the ceremony was abruptly
ended by Federal artillery and Smith retiring to Harrodsburg. This caused Bragg
to believe more firmly that the Federals main force was advancing on Frankfort, then on to Lexington. These ideas were reinforced when
it was reported that two Federal divisions were moving from Bardstown to Lexington. Also, Scott’s
Cavalry reported that the enemy, about 20,000 strong, had crossed the river at Frankfort. Therefore,
Bragg sent Smith to assemble his army at Versailles.
Bragg’s theory was questioned
later that afternoon when he received dispatches from Perryville. Both Hardee
and Wheeler reported that the enemy was approaching in strong force. In reply to this, Bragg wrote General Polk
that “In view of the news from Hardee you had better move with Cheatham's
division to his support and give the enemy battle immediately; rout him, and
then move to our support at Versailles.”
Bragg’s assumption of a quick rout was questioned again that night when General Smith, near Versailles,
reported that the “enemy has made no move from Frankfort, nor do I think they have crossed
the river in very large force. The force crossed is entirely infantry”. Despite
these new developments, Bragg did not alter his plan. He believed that the
battle would take place around Versailles.
(12)
On the morning of October 8, Bragg received
a letter from Polk, explaining that he had encountered the enemy’s pickets and
that he would “bring on the engagement vigorously” However, when Bragg heard no
guns, he rode out to the battlefield to see what was happening. When Bragg
arrived at the battlefield, Polk explained why he had not attacked. Due to the
enemy’s numerical superiority, Polk had assumed the “defensive-offensive”. This
strategy was not in Bragg’s plan. The force in front of Polk had to be diversionary to the much larger force
around Versailles.
Bragg wrote: “After a hasty reconnaissance and consultation orders were given
for some changes deemed necessary in the line of battle; a portion of it being
withdrawn was restored, and Major-General Polk was ordered to bring on the
engagement. Impatient at the delay after this order I dispatched a staff
officer to repeat it to the general, and
soon thereafter I followed in person and put the troops in motion.” (13)
Cleburne reported: “About
midday on the 8th of October, instant, my brigade was ordered to be formed in
line of battle east of the Harrodsburg and Perryville road, supported by the
brigade of General Liddell. From this position we were ordered to advance
across Chaplin Creek and support the brigade of Brigadier-General [Bushrod] Johnson.”
(14)
General Hardee described the battlefield
this way.
The country near
Perryville is boldly undulating and varied with farm-houses, corn fields, and
plantations, bordered by native forests. A creek called Chaplin Fork flows
northwardly through the village and unites 4 or 5 miles beyond it with another
little stream called Doctor's Fork. The space between the two from east to west
is about 1 1/2 miles. A good road running a little south of east Mackville to
Perryville crosses this stream, and a turnpike from Springfield
running nearly east and west passes through Perryville to Danville. Another fine macadamized highway
traverses the village from the south in a northwardly direction toward
Harrodsburg and Lexington and another
southwardly in the direction of Lebanon.
The position at Perryville is strong, and offered many tactical and strategical
advantages. The key of the enemy's position was at a point where the Mackville
road crosses Doctor's Fork, about 1 1/2 miles from the village, near a barn and
white farm-house on the hill west of the creek.
Brigadier
General Bushrod Johnson, whose brigade was on the frontline wrote:
The slope in front of my brigade was broken by
slight spurs and by an undulation running nearly parallel with the general
direction of the brow of the hill. In front of the right wing of the brigade
and just below the crest of the undulation was a farm-house, with outhouses,
orchard, and inclosed grounds. A rail fence ran nearly parallel with the crest
of the undulation and to the left of the farm-house. Below this fence about 200
yards was the east bank of the Doctor's Fork, along a portion of which in front
of my brigade was a stone fence, and the bank itself was nearly vertical, of
solid rock, and from 3 to 5 feet high. Behind this bank the enemy were in
position, with skirmishers advanced to the rail fence and farm-house on the
undulation above. On the opposite or west bank and running parallel to the
general direction of the stream was another stone fence, inclosing in part the
yard of a farm-house, and a fence on the west side of this yard was also of
stone. Beyond this last fence was the house or barn which was burned during the
conflict of my brigade with the enemy. The Mackville and Perryville road
descended the slope on the north side of the farm-house, leaving a yard in its
front partly inclosed on that side by a stone fence and partly by a rail one.
On the north side of the Mackville road and to the right of the farm-house last
referred to was an elevation commanding the open fields and grounds on the
west, south, and north, and much of the slope on the east of the creek. This
height, the three stone walls (each commanding the one more advanced toward our
position), and the crest of the hill above them all were occupied by the enemy
or held within their lines. The position was a very strong one. There was perhaps
none stronger in the enemy's lines.
Cleburne arrived on the
scene at about 2:30 and placed his brigade behind a stone fence while waiting
for further orders. Directly in their front, Bushrod Johnson’s Brigade pushed
forward, crossed Doctor’s Fork “and became hotly engaged with the enemy”. (15)
Johnson pushed Federal skirmishers back
across Doctor’s Fork while suffering enfilading fire from two batteries
throwing “balls and spherical case shot”. Johnson pushed the enemy back across the
creek, driving them “from their strong defensive positions behind the stone
walls and into the open field beyond the farm houses on the north of the
Doctor's Fork”. (16)
“As Cleburne
watched, Johnson’s men moved up the far slope, then slowed, and finally stopped
as the smoke from thousands of muskets filled the valley.” Johnson fought with
the enemy for about two hours; holding the stone wall and inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy who was fighting in the open. However, three of
Johnson’s regiments reported that their ammunition was exhausted. Finally,
Johnson called for support. (17)
Cleburne received this
message and ordered his brigade to advance. “We advanced down the open ground
into the creek bottom exposed to a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms. I
ordered the brigade to advance in double time and we were soon in the rocky bed
of the creek so immediately under the enemy that their fire passed harmlessly
over us.” Here, Cleburne
halted his brigade and conferred with Johnson. Johnson explained the situation,
stating that his men were out of ammunition and that he would have to withdraw.
He suggested that while he was doing this, Cleburne’s Brigade should take the frontline.
Cleburne
agreed. (18)
Cleburne placed the 13th/15th
Arkansas Regiment far to the right against a stone wall so as to flank the
enemies’ left. “About this time General [Johnson’s] brigade had exhausted their
ammunition and fell back into the bed of the creek; at the same time I move
forward and occupied the position previously by his brigade. On examination I
found the enemy had been driven back from the stone wall near the crest of the
ridge and were now sheltering themselves behind the crest. I ordered the
Fifteenth Arkansas back to their position on the right of my line and sent
forward skirmishers to reconnoiter the enemy's line preparatory to an advance.”
(19)
Cleburne, hoping to deceive
the enemy, ordered his skirmishers to carry the battle flags. “I now advanced
in line of battle, my skirmishers ten paces in front of the line and carrying
the battle-flags of the regiments.” The brigade was ascending the hill that the
enemy was behind when they received fire from their rear. Several of the men
fell dead or wounded from artillery fire from the Confederate lines. Cleburne ordered his men
to fall back and sent an aide to stop the battery. Cleburne accounted for this error from the
fact that most of his men wore Federal blue pants that had been captured from
the Battle of Richmond. (20)
The brigade once again advanced with
skirmishers 10 paces ahead of the main line. “The moment our [flags], carried
by the line of skirmishers, appeared above the crest of the hill, the enemy,
supposing our line of battle was in view, emptied their guns at the line of
skirmishers.” While the Federals were reloading, Cleburne’s main line rushed passed the
skirmishers, through the smoke, leveled their rifles, and released “a deadly
fire” into their confused and unprepared ranks. The Confederates then charged
into the lines of the dazed Federals, giving them steel and routing them. The
Federal commander rallied about 100 of his men, but these were soon routed. (21)
Whooping the blood-curdling Rebel yell, Cleburne’s Brigade pursued
the shattered Federals. One Confederate recalled “It was a hot evening, and the
grass being dry, [it] caught fire, and the flames spreading to a barn just to
our right. Rather than burn, out hustled a lot of blue coats to surrender.” Cleburne wrote: “We
continued to advance through a corn-field, and became so scattered in the
pursuit I found it necessary to halt the brigade and reform line of battle.” Cleburne advanced his
brigade to within 75 yards of a house “where a fresh line of the enemy were
strongly posted, flanked by artillery”. (22)
The fresh line of Federals was commanded by
General Lovell Rousseau. He wrote: “I saw a heavy force of the enemy advancing
upon our right, the same that had turned Lytle’s right flank. It was moving
steadily up, in full view of where [Federal] General [C.C.] Gilbert’s army
corps had been during the day, the left flank of which was not more than 400
yards from it”. Rousseau ordered his battery to open upon the Confederates. “He
at once opened fire with alacrity and with fearful effect upon the ranks of the
enemy. It was admirably done; but the enemy moved straight ahead, his ranks now
raked by battery and terribly thinned by the musketry of the Seventeenth
[Lytle’s] Brigade, but he scarcely faltered”. (23)
Cleburne, who was riding his
prized mount Dixie, was a conspicuous target. During
this advance, one artillery shell exploded near him, killing Dixie
and spilling him to the ground with a leg wound. The Federals thought that the
rebel general had been killed and shouted “Hurrah!”. One captain even recorded
in his report that Cleburne
had been killed. However, he was up almost immediately, leading the advance on
foot, shouting “give ‘em hell boys!” So steady was the advance, one of the
Federal battery’s was forced to limber up and move to safety to avoid capture. (24)
Cleburne was protected on
his right by a large Confederate regiment. Since Cleburne had no support to the left, he sent
Captain Carlton commanding sharpshooters there to protect that flank. Later, Cleburne would commend
them by writing: “Captain Carlton, commanding the bridge sharpshooters, distinguished
himself for coolness and bravery.”(25)
About this time, the large Confederate
regiment to Cleburne’s
right gave way. Despite his entreaties to stay, the regiment fled to the rear,
“leaving my small brigade of not over 800 men in the center of the battle,
unsupported on either flank.” “A furious cannonade between our own artillery,
posted on the hill we first carried on the right of the Mackville road, and the
enemy's artillery, posted on the right of the white house before mentioned, was
carried on our own line. This, together with the fact that [we] were almost out
of ammunition, prevented us from advancing farther.” As night came, Liddell’s
Brigade moved up and flanked the enemy that was attacking Cleburne’s. The enemy was so surprised that
they “retired altogether from this part of the field” (26)
The Confederates had driven the Federals
from the field. Nevertheless, the Federals were not entirely broken up. At the
beginning of the battle, 16,000 Confederates were fighting about 27,000
Federals. However, as the battle raged on into the afternoon and as night fell,
it became apparent that this was not simply a decoy to divert troops from Frankfort, as Bragg had
suspected. At about 6 pm, it became clear that the opposing force at Perryville
was Buell’s main force. This was
affirmed when an entire corps which had not fought in the battle, but was part
of the same army, was discovered passing to the left rear of Bragg’s lines.
When Bragg learned of this, he paced his
headquarters’ floor in utter anguish while wringing his hands. Fearing that
Bragg would not make up his mind in time before the rest of Buell’s 60,000 man
surrounded them, Polk and Hardee convinced him that the only thing to do was to
withdraw to Harrodsburg. Finally, he agreed. No doubt Cleburne, as well as the rest of the army was
sickened by this great blunder which was foreseen by everyone but Bragg. The
Confederate’s suffered 3,396 casualties while the Federals suffered 4,211
casualties.
As his now thinned brigade withdrew, Cleburne, who had been
wounded twice in the battle, rode back in the ambulance. The wagon carried him
from the point of his brigade’s deepest drive, once the scene of such success but
where so many of his men fell, and carried him back to Harrodsburg. The battle
of Perryville would be labeled a Union tactical victory. That night, Cleburne had dinner with
Robert D. Smith, who had been nearly killed several times in his duties of
ordinance-master to the brigade.
On October 10, the two armies of Bragg and
Smith met for the first time at Harrodsburg. South of town, Bragg and Smith
placed their armies in strong positions; awaiting a Federal assault. The
troops’ morale was lifted slightly at the prospect of a decisive battle and a
chance to hold Kentucky.
Bragg appeared confident during the day, but when night fell and no assault
came, he became hesitant. By dawn, the entire Confederate force had retreated
to Camp Dick Robinson.
On October 13, the Confederates began their
inglorious retreat out of Kentucky.
Thankfully, Buell carried out a halfhearted pursuit, stating that “the roads were too rough and the country too barren”. (27)
On October 14,
Kirby Smith wrote to Bragg. “My command, from loss of sleep for five nights, is
completely exhausted. The straggling has been unusually great. The rear of the
column will not reach here before daybreak. I have no hope of saving the whole
of my train, as I shall be obliged to double teams in going up Big Hill, and
will be necessarily delayed there two or three days.” (28)
On October 15,
Smith’s Army reached Big
Hill Mountain.
Towering 625 feet, the mountain had only a dirt road to travel on; this running
nearly straight up to the top. Bragg’s wagons, which were to leave the state by
a different route, had lost their way and became entangled with Smith’s wagons
for seven miles. This entanglement obstructed the infantry’s progress. Smith,
annoyed, wrote Bragg: “The
ordnance train is not yet up the Big Hill. The road is still blocked up with
trains, many of which, it seems, belong to your command”. (29)
Smith,
disparaging greatly, ordered the wagons which contained captured supplies to be
parked alongside the road and burned, thus allowing his troops to proceed.
These wagons
contained some 37,000 rifles and two million cartridges taken at Richmond and Perryville. Cleburne, still off duty
from his leg wound saw the great value of these stores and urged that the
wagons be not burned. He volunteered to take charge of them and was granted
unlimited authority.
He immediately
took charge of the situation, placing guards along the road to put the many
stragglers to work. From the base to the summit, men lined both sides of the
road, pushing the wagons and helping the teams of animals over the steepest
spots. Cleburne
also put the officers, who were ridding leisurely by on horseback, to work.
As the troops
retreated through East Tennessee, the weather
turned harsh. They survived on scarce rations such as biscuits and onions and
were occasionally fired upon from ambush in that pro-Federal area. Robert D.
Smith recorded: “Our brigade had a regular old cursing of Genl Bragg last night
for not having more rations issued”. The retreat, like all retreats, was a
miserable one; occasionally Unionists would fire at them from ambush as they
passed through East Tennessee. By October 26,
the day that Cleburne’s Brigade reached Knoxville, a heavy snow
had fallen. (30)
Sources
1: Robert D. Smith: page 60
2: Battle for the
Bluegrass: Article from America's
Civil War Magazine
3: Robert D. Smith: page 64
4: Bragg’s Report
of the Kentucky Campaign: O. R. Series I Volume 16 part I pages 1088-1094
5: Battle for the Bluegrass
6: O. R.
Series I Volume 16 part I pages 1088-1094
7: Co. Aytch: Chapter 5 page 45
:O. R. Series I Volume 16 part I pages
1088-1094
8: Pat
Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 7 page 84
9: Pat Cleburne
Confederate General: Chapter 7 page 85
: O. R.
Series I Volume 16 part I pages 1088-1094
10: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 7
page 85
11: Robert D. Smith: page 66
: Ibid
: Pat Cleburne
Confederate General: Chapter 7 page 86
: Ibid
12: O. R. Series I Volume 16 part I pages
1088-1094
:
Report of Kirby Smith O.R. Series I Vol. 16 Part 1 pg 933-935
13: O. R. Series I Volume 16 part I pages
1088-1094
: Ibid
: Ibid
14: Cleburne’s report of the
Battle of Perryville: O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
15:
General Hardee’s report of Perryville: O.R. Series I Vol.
16 part 1 pg. 1119-1122
: General Bushrod Johnson’s report of
Perryville: O.R Series I Vol. 16 part 1 pages 1124-1127
: O.R. Series I Vol.
LII pg 51-53
16:
O.R Series I Vol. 16 part 1 pages 1124-1127
: Ibid
17: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page 95
18: O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
19: O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
20:
O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
21:
O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
: Ibid
22:
Stonewall of the West: Chapter 5 page
96
: O.R. Series I Vol.
LII pg 51-53
: Ibid
23:
Pat Cleburne Confederate General: Chapter 7 pages
90-91
: Ibid
24: A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 4 page 84
25: O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
26:
O.R. Series I Vol. LII pg 51-53
: Ibid
: Ibid
27:
Battle for the
Bluegrass
28: E.K. Smith to Bragg O.R Series I Vol. 16
part 2 pg 943
29:
E.K Smith to Bragg O.R. Series I Vol. 16 part 2 pg 949
30:
Robert D. Smith: page 71